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The extent to which horizontal mergers deliver competitive benefits that offset any 
potential for competitive harm is a critical issue of antitrust enforcement. This Article 
evaluates economic analyses of merger efficiencies and concludes that a substantial 
body of work casts doubt on their presumptive existence and magnitude. That has 
two significant implications. First, the current methods used by the federal antitrust 
agencies to determine whether to investigate a horizontal merger likely rests on an 
overly-optimistic view of the existence of cognizable efficiencies, which we believe has 
the effect of justifying market-concentration thresholds that are likely too lax. Second, 
criticisms of the current treatment of efficiencies as too demanding—for example, that 
antitrust agencies and reviewing courts require too much of merging parties in 
demonstrating the existence of efficiencies—are misplaced, in part because they fail to 
recognize that full-blown merger investigations and subsequent litigation are focused 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines1 (2010 HMG) establish the 
current basis by which the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice evaluate horizontal mergers, which are 
mergers of competitors or acquisitions of one competitor by another.2 
 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7GS9-9HAR] [hereinafter 2010 HMG]. 
2 Simply put, a horizontal merger combines two current or potential competitors, which is to 
say firms that are operating in the same product market, such as two firms that sell Pay TV services 
to consumers. “Vertical mergers combine firms or assets that operate at different stages of the same 
supply chain.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 1 n.2 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1561715/p810034verticalmergerguidelinesdraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLT5-HD8A] [hereinafter 
2020 Draft Vertical Guidelines]. So, for example, the AT&T/Time Warner Entertainment merger, 
which the Department of Justice failed to persuade a federal court to block, is a vertical merger 
because it combined the seller of Pay TV services (DirecTV) with the creator of content that was 
included in the Pay TV service. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(decision affirming the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction of the “proposed vertical 
merger of a programmer and a distributor in the same industry”). Vertical (or to be more specific, 
nonhorizontal) mergers are beyond the scope of this Article, although they do raise important 
questions about the treatment of efficiencies. See Xavier Becerra et al., Public Comments of 28 State 
Attorneys General on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, 17-23 (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/798-draft-vertical-merger-guidelines/state_ags_final_
vmg_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE8D-29NQ]. 
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Although they are not binding on courts, the Guidelines have been relied 
upon by courts reviewing horizontal mergers.3 
The Guidelines establish a taxonomy for analysis that has become familiar 
to antitrust economists and attorneys, for example, defining product and 
geographic markets, calculating market shares, considering unilateral and 
coordinated effects, and then, importantly, looking to outcomes that could defeat 
any possible anticompetitive effects, very notably the existence of efficiencies.4 
Here is a stylized example of the role that efficiencies might play in an 
antitrust review. Imagine two paper manufacturers, each with a single factory 
that produces several kinds of paper, and suppose their marginal costs decline 
with longer production runs of a single type of paper. They wish to merge, 
which by definition eliminates a competitor. They justify the merger on the 
ground that after they combine their operations, they will increase the 
specialization in each plant, enabling longer runs and lower marginal costs, 
and thus incentivizing them to lower prices to their customers and expand 
output. If the cost reduction were sufficiently large, such efficiencies could 
offset the merger’s otherwise expected tendency to increase prices.5 
Under the 2010 HMG, the agencies will not challenge a merger if the 
cognizable efficiencies—that is, “merger-specific efficiencies that have been 
verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or 
service”—are sufficient to ensure the merger “is not likely to be 
 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Although 
the Guidelines are not binding, the D.C. Circuit and other courts have looked to them for guidance 
in previous merger cases.”); United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F. 3d 345, 356-60 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(citing the guidelines to evaluate the parties’ arguments about efficiencies); United States v. CVS 
Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2019) (observing that the disputed “market is 
‘moderately,’ as opposed to ‘highly,’ concentrated under the Government’s guidelines”). 
4 Following Hovenkamp infra note 51, we use the term “efficiencies” to refer to the class of 
outcomes that include resource savings and lower unit costs that may offset competitive harms. A 
broader term might be “competitive benefits” but we use the term “efficiencies” because the agencies 
and courts employ the terminology. Cost reductions that result from pecuniary savings, which are 
transfers rather than efficiencies, or from merger-specific increases in market power, which are 
further competitive harm, are not efficiencies. These concepts are discussed further below. 
Efficiencies are not the only factor that can blunt the potential anticompetitive harm of a merger; 
for example, entry of new firms may prevent the merged firm from exercising market power. See 
2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 27-29. For the purposes of this discussion, we posit a proposed horizontal 
merger in which the only basis used to contest the threat of harm is the claim of efficiencies. That is 
a simplification; courts can rely on efficiencies alongside other contentions. See e.g., New York v. 
Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434-VM-RWL, slip op. at 57 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2020) (“The 
trend among lower courts has thus been to recognize or at least assume that evidence of efficiencies 
may rebut the presumption that a merger’s effects will be anticompetitive, even if such evidence 
could not be used as a defense to an actually anticompetitive merger.”). 
5 The hypothetical is not, of course, comprehensive; it does not consider, for example, their 
market shares, whether the relevant market is highly concentrated, or whether entry barriers exist. 
Id.; infra notes 96, 126. 
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anticompetitive in any relevant market.”6 Thus, when the concern is that the 
merged company would unilaterally raise prices, efficiencies must be 
sufficient to offset all upward pricing pressure from the loss of a competitor.7 
The focus is on outcomes that improve competition, for example, a reduction 
in the resources needed to produce a given output, lowering per-unit costs.8 
In this Article, we concentrate on two separate phases of antitrust 
enforcement. The first, and less studied, concerns the process by which the 
federal antitrust agencies decide whether to launch a full-blown investigation of 
a proposed merger: a so-called “Second Request.”9 Only a small fraction of 
proposed mergers receive such attention, but the agencies challenge a substantial 
portion of horizontal mergers that are fully investigated and have a high success 
rate when challenging horizontal mergers in court.10 The dichotomy in outcomes 
between the bulk of mergers that receive relatively quick approval and those few 
that are subject to a full-blown investigation is stark. 
We examine two questions: First, are the federal antitrust agencies under-
investigating mergers? We believe the likely answer to this question is “yes.” 
The federal antitrust agencies appear to rely on an approach that gives too 
much implicit weight to the existence of efficiencies in their decisions 
whether to investigate mergers even though the agencies do not conduct an 
individualized analysis of efficiencies for the vast majority of mergers that do 
not result in a full-fledged investigation, because they lack the detailed 
information at that stage in the process to do so. We describe below the 
existence of what we call a “standard efficiency credit,” which is to say a 
 
6 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30. The analysis of efficiencies in the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines is essentially the same as that first established by the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
7 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31 (“[T]he Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies 
likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”). 
8 See C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078, 2081-
2 (2018) (“Input price reductions from a merger that reflect real resource savings present a potential 
source of efficiencies.”); see also infra Part III. 
9 As we explain below, parties proposing mergers and acquisitions that meet certain financial 
thresholds must notify the federal antitrust agencies of their intent to consummate their transactions 
and provide information on the transaction and potential competitive overlaps, thus triggering the 
opportunity for agency review. See infra notes  116-17 and accompanying text. Merger investigations 
typically proceed in two phases: the opening of a preliminary investigation during the first thirty 
days following a Hart–Scott–Rodino (HSR) filing (sometimes called “Phase I”), which allows the 
agency to make an initial determination of whether a more in depth-examination is needed to 
determine potential competitive harm; and a much more intensive second investigatory phase 
initiated by an agency’s “Second Request” for information. For simplicity, our definition of full 
investigations excludes those closed before issuing a Second Request. Merger Review, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-and-competition/merger-
review [https://perma.cc/5BGG-AAKJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
10 See infra Part IV. 
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generalized belief in the existence of at least modest and ubiquitous 
efficiencies, which we argue below is likely overstated but has the effect of 
justifying market-concentration thresholds that are therefore likely to be too 
lax.11 Second, are the burdens placed on parties to demonstrate assertions of 
efficiencies too high? We believe that the answer to this question is “no,” and 
critics are not justified in asserting that the federal antitrust agencies and 
reviewing courts demand too much of merging parties when the existence of 
claimed efficiencies are reviewed in an individual transaction. 
Our answers to these questions are informed by our analysis of the 
economic literature, which concludes that a substantial body of work casts 
doubt on the presumptive existence, magnitude, and importance of efficiencies 
in horizontal mergers.12 That challenges the revisionist Chicago School 
approach, exemplified by Robert Bork,13 which holds that horizontal mergers 
inevitably produce merger-specific efficiencies. Acceptance of the Chicago 
School assertion of ubiquitous efficiencies by antitrust practitioners and 
enforcement agencies has been a change with significant long-lasting effects. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
treatment of efficiencies in horizontal merger policy, both in terms of historical 
development and current practice. Part II discusses what should properly be 
considered an efficiency—a designation that we believe includes true resource 
savings but not the use of newly-acquired market power—and draws 
conclusions from the economic literature on the existence and magnitude of 
such efficiencies. Part III considers the factors that go into deciding whether to 
launch a full-fledged investigation,14 and concludes that belief in the 
generalized existence of efficiencies has led to the application of market 
concentration standards that are likely too lax and that should be reviewed. Part 
 
11 See e.g., Michael Salinger, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Four Questions about 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 3 (Sept. 14, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/four-questions-about-horizontal-merger-enforcement/050914ababro
wnbag.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3CR-QZPW] (“If, however, we are unable to assess efficiencies on a 
case-by-case basis, then I see no alternative to treating the cost of a ‘false block’ as being the average 
improvement in efficiency, an approach I refer to as the ‘standard deduction’ approach to merger 
efficiencies.”); Louis Kaplow, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis 43-56 (April 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the authors) (discussing and identifying literature concerning the origins 
of “an efficiency credit, akin to the standard deduction in the U.S. individual income tax”); see also 
infra Section II.B, notes 136–37 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that resource 
constraints also may have contributed significantly to narrowing the horizontal merger enforcement 
aperture. MICHAEL KADES, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, THE STATE OF U.S. 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 17-18 (2019) (reporting the decline in DOJ and FTC 
budgets in real terms over the past two decades). 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 ROBERT H. BORK, Horizontal Mergers, in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF 217 (1978). 
14 See infra Part III and note 115 (noting resource limitations and the importance of additional 
antitrust resources). 
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IV reviews criticisms of the federal antitrust agencies’ treatment of efficiencies 
when investigating or challenging a merger in court and finds that, given 
current economic understandings, they are not well-founded. 
I. THE RISE OF EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND INCREASED THRESHOLDS 
FOR MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE IMPLICIT STANDARD 
EFFICIENCY CREDIT 
Since the issuance of the first merger guidelines in 1968, the antitrust 
agencies have changed their approaches to (i) the existence and treatment of 
efficiencies and (ii) the use of market concentration analysis to identify mergers 
that may be presumed to be likely to harm competition. The co-evolution of 
these has reinforced a tendency toward leniency: over time, the accommodation 
of efficiencies has expanded and market concentration thresholds identifying 
problematic mergers have risen. One can conceive of these as linked through 
the implicit use of what we call a standard efficiency credit; a generalized 
assumption that horizontal mergers typically generate a level of efficiencies 
that could offset modest increases in market power. While this credit is neither 
explicit nor applied directly in individual cases, its implied presence has likely 
contributed to the increase in the level of market concentration measures that 
are deemed to trigger the so-called structural presumption.15 Such market-
concentration measures define the circumstances in which, based on the impact 
of a merger on market concentration alone, the government can establish a 
prima facie case of anticompetitive harm without the need for additional 
evidence (which is to say they establish the structural presumption).16 Thus, if 
the working assumption about the ubiquity and magnitude of efficiencies is 
wrong, the agencies may be applying their presumption of harm too narrowly. 
In this Part, we review the evolution of the antitrust agencies’ approach as 
expressed through the merger guidelines. Beginning in 1968, the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice itself offered instruction on the manner 
in which it would analyze horizontal mergers; in 1992, and since, the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines have been issued jointly by the Federal Trade Commission 
and the Antitrust Division.17 Over time, the treatment of efficiencies became 
more generous, the economic perspective favoring their acceptance became 
widely-accepted, and the level of market concentration that signals 
presumptive harm increased, as summarized in Table 1 and described below. 
 
 
15 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 29 and 125 and accompanying text. 
17 For a history of the evolution of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as they deal with 
efficiencies, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 213 (2003).  
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Treatment of Efficiencies 
Market Concentration 








“Unless there are exceptional 
circumstances, the 
Department will not accept 
as a justification for 
a[	horizontal] acquisition	.	.	. 
the claim that the merger 
will produce economies (i.e., 
improvements in 
efficiency).”18  
“In a market in which the 
shares of the four largest 
firms amount to 
approximately 75% or 
more, the Department will 
ordinarily challenge 
mergers” that would 
include the combination of 
a firm with 4% market 
share acquiring another 
firm with a market share of 




“Except in extraordinary 
cases, the Department will 
not consider a claim of 
specific efficiencies as a 
mitigating factor	.	.	.	.”20 
Defined a highly 
concentrated market as 
having an Hirschman 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
above 1800; the DOJ is 
likely to challenge mergers 
resulting in HHIs above 
1800 that produce an 
increase in the HHI of 100 
points or more.21 
 
18 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 8 (1968), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/M68J-
FBP6] [hereinafter 1968 MG]. 
19 Id. at 6. 
20 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES 29 (1982) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CYT-
LQTJ] [hereinafter 1982 MG]. 
21 Id. at 13-15. In the 1982 MG, the DOJ notes that an HHI of 1800 corresponds roughly to a 
four-firm concentration ratio of 70%. Id. at 13. The 1968 DOJ guidelines focused on a four-firm ratio 
of 75%. 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6. The DOJ points out that the 100-point increase in the HHI 
would not be triggered by the acquisition of a firm with less than 7% market share by a firm with a 
less than 7% market share, 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 14 n.31, a larger merger than the 4%/4% merger 
that would have triggered a challenge under the 1968 MG. 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6. 
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1984  
MG DOJ 
“The primary benefit of 
mergers to the economy is 
their efficiency-enhancing 
potential”; “If the parties to 
the merger establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that 
a merger will achieve such 
[net] efficiencies, the 
Department will consider 
those efficiencies in deciding 
whether to challenge the 
merger.”22 
 
Except in extraordinary 
cases, the Department will 
challenge a merger where 
the HHI increase exceeds 
100 and the post-merger 





The “clear and convincing” 
standard is dropped. “The 
expected net efficiencies must 
be greater the more 
significant are the competitive 
risks identified” and “[t]he 
burden with respect to 
efficiency and failure 
continues to reside with the 
proponents of the merger.”24 
 
“Where the post-merger 
HHI exceeds 1800, it will 
be presumed that mergers 
producing an increase in 
the HHI of more than 100 
points are likely to create 
or enhance market power 





Revision to 1992 joint DOJ-
FTC Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines incorporating new 
Section 4 on efficiencies, to 
clarify how the agencies 
analyze efficiency claims. The 






22 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, 15, 23 (1984), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NRT-
JZ2V] [hereinafter 1984 MG]. 
23 Id. 
24 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, 2 n.5, 28 (1992), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XYF-
6Y69] [hereinafter 1992 HMG]. 
25 Id. at 15-16. 





Maintains 1997 approach to 
efficiencies. 
“Mergers resulting in 
highly concentrated 
markets [HHI above 2500] 
that involve an increase in 
the HHI of more than 200 
points will be presumed to 
be likely to enhance 
market power.”26 This is 
the most generous market 
concentration measure that 
the Agencies have 
employed. 
 
A. 1968-1978: Early Merger Guidelines, Williamson & Bork 
The first Merger Guidelines were issued by the Department of Justice in 
1968 (1968 MG).27 They are notable in three respects. First, they take a very 
dim view of an efficiencies defense, consistent with the prevailing view of the 
courts at the time: “Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the 
Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisition normally 
subject to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim that the 
merger will produce economies.”28 
Second, they established the forerunner of the current structural 
presumption, reflecting the Supreme Court’s decision five years earlier in 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, in which it used a measure of 
market concentration to construct a presumption of harm.29 Using the four-
firm market concentration measure that was standard before the introduction 
of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) analysis,30 the guidelines 
explained that “[i]n a market in which the shares of the four largest firms 
amount to 75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers” 
that would include, for example, the combination of a firm with 4% market 
share acquiring another firm with a market share of 4% or more.31 
 
26 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19. 
27 1968 MG, supra note 18. 
28 Id. at 8. 
29 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963) (referring to “a merger 
which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market [that] results in 
a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market”). 
30 See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
31 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6. 
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Third, the 1968 guidelines connect the view of efficiencies with the market 
concentration analysis. The guidelines explained that the relevant range for 
economies of scale was likely below the level that would produce challenges, 
in other words, that the presumption of harm was sufficiently relaxed to 
accommodate those efficiencies that might exist.32 
The academic and policy debate over merger efficiencies was transformed 
by a second event in 1968: publication of Oliver Williamson’s theoretical 
model illuminating a tension that could occur when mergers increased both 
market power and cost savings.33 Williamson described the “welfare trade-
offs” between productive efficiency gains and consumer losses, illustrated in 
Figure 1 below.34 Importantly, Williamson focuses on “total welfare,” an 
economic term for the sum of producer (firms) and consumer (buyers) 
surpluses, rather than analyzing the merger’s impact only on consumers of 
the firms’ products.35 
 
Figure 1: Williamson’s Welfare Tradeoffs36 
 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968). Williamson came to the topic when, as an economist in the Antitrust 
Division, he was tasked by then-Assistant Attorney General Donald Turner to explore the topic in 
advance of the issuance of the 1968 merger guidelines. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 17, at 7. 
34 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21. 
35 Williamson’s analysis applies to a merger of competing sellers, so the focus is on buyers of 
the product. A merger of competing buyers could induce an analogous but upstream anticompetitive 
harm, in that case to suppliers to the merging firms. For a discussion of buy-side mergers, see 
Hemphill & Rose, supra note 8, at 2082-92. For a discussion of total welfare, see also infra note 72. 
36 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21. 
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In what he labels a “naïve tradeoff”37 analysis, Williamson begins with an 
industry equilibrium with price P1 equal to average costs AC1, as illustrated 
above. Though he does not mention marginal cost in his article, both Figure 
1 and the analysis implicitly assume perfect competition pre-merger—that is, 
that price is equal to marginal costs, and both are equal to average costs of 
AC1.38 He then considers a merger that would increase market power and 
raise price to P2, while simultaneously creating efficiencies that reduce costs 
to AC2. Williamson’s Figure 1 shows that the deadweight loss to consumers 
who no longer purchase a product (the triangular cross-hatched area A1) may 
be offset by the gain from cost savings that accrue to the firms (the rectangular 
cross-hatched area A2). When A2 is larger than A1, the net impact on total 
welfare is positive. 
Williamson argued that an efficiency gain would not have to be very large 
to outweigh consumer harm: “since a relatively large percentage increase in 
price is usually required to offset the benefits that result from a 5 to 10 percent 
reduction in average costs, the existence of economies of this magnitude is 
sufficiently important to give the antitrust authorities pause before 
disallowing such a merger.”39 His argument is critically dependent on a set of 
implicit assumptions, importantly including that the firms have no market 
power pre-merger; if there were prior market power, there would be 
additional harm from the merger not shown in his diagram.40 Moreover, 
Williamson’s naïve tradeoff analysis is indifferent as to whether any of the 
efficiencies flow to consumers—they may all be captured by the merged firm 
through higher profits, as in his example. Further, losses to consumers who 
continue to buy the product, but at a higher price, are not considered as a 
competitive harm, but “merely” a transfer from consumers to producers.41 
 
37 Id. at 24-32 (noting the naïve nature of the partial equilibrium analysis and describing myriad 
considerations that could alter its conclusions, including general equilibrium effects, inference and 
enforcement expenses, delayed timing, incipiency, price increases by competitors of the merging 
firms in response to the merger, income distribution concerns, concentration of political power, 
impact on innovation, and managerial slack). Subsequent commentators have noted other 
qualifications that limit or reverse the inferences that Williamson draws. See, e.g., infra note40. 
38 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21-23. While Williamson refers only to average costs in his article, 
the shaded areas in Figure 1 and comparisons of the magnitudes of efficiency gains to deadweight losses 
are correct only when marginal cost is equal to average cost; that is, for perfect competition under a 
constant returns to scale production technology. If the initial price is above marginal cost, the 
deadweight loss from further market power would be greater than in this figure. See infra note 40. 
39 Williamson, supra note 33, at 34. 
40 See supra Figure 1; MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 60-62 
(2006) (arguing that proponents of Williamson’s argument frequently fail to appreciate the dependence 
of this relative welfare comparison on a number of assumptions that may not be met. If firms have market 
power even prior to the merger, for example, the incremental harm from increased market power makes 
the merger more likely to reduce total welfare for any given level of cost efficiencies). 
41 Williamson, supra note 33, at 28. 
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Williamson’s emphasis on total welfare was embraced but relabeled by 
Robert Bork in The Antitrust Paradox.42 While Bork argues he is applying a 
“consumer welfare” standard, this is belied by his claim that “consumers have 
lost	.	.	.	the area labeled A1—-and have gained in resource savings an amount 
equal to the area A2,” which represents “merely a shift of income between two 
classes of consumers.”43 Two classes exist, in Bork’s argument, because the 
owners of the merged company are themselves consumers and their gains thus 
fit within the scope of consumer welfare. This terminology is inconsistent 
with both the economic nomenclature and common understanding of 
consumer welfare, and at direct odds with Williamson, who highlights the 
redistribution from consumers to firms. Indeed, Bork ignores this and more 
than eight pages of qualifications that Williamson lays out as possible 
objections to the conclusions of his “naïve tradeoff ” model. But, as we will 
see, Bork’s argument continues to influence the debate over the “benefits” 
that merger authorities should recognize.44 
Bork made a second fundamental point—one that diverged from 
Williamson’s focus on the measurement of total welfare effects and remains 
important today. Bork believed that it is not necessary, or indeed possible, to 
calculate individual efficiencies at all; rather, they should be presumed to 
exist.45 In other words, “[e]conomic analysis does away with the need to 
measure efficiencies directly. It is enough to know in what sorts of 
transactions efficiencies are likely to be present and in what sorts 
anticompetitive effects are likely to be present.”46 Bork specifically suggested 
that market shares could be used as a means of screening merger efficiencies, 
foreshadowing the current approach, which has been traced back to the 
Chicago School’s skepticism of the ability of antitrust enforcers and courts to 
calculate efficiencies in individual cases.47 
 
42 BORK, supra note 13, at 107-12; see also Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing 
the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1876 (“Bork adopted [the Williamson] 
model in the late 1970s, but renamed it ‘consumer welfare.’”). 
43 BORK, supra note 13, at 108-10. 
44 See Part IV, infra. 
45 BORK, supra note 13, at 124-29; see also Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 42, at 1875 
(“Bork as well as Posner believed that efficiencies could not be measured in specific antitrust cases 
but must be presumed.”). 
46 Williamson, supra note 33, at 20 (quoting Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 401, 411 (1965)). See generally Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense under Section 7 
of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417, 429 n.203 (1980) (noting that Bork contended that 
requiring an efficiency justification was unwarranted and reviewing the application of Bork’s approach). 
47 See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing the 1982 Merger Guidelines); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976) (stating that individual 
efficiencies need not be calculated). 
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B. 1982-2010: Greater Recognition of Efficiencies and Higher Thresholds for 
Market Concentration 
The 1982 MG introduced the use of Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
as a measure of market concentration and recast the circumstances in which 
harm would be presumed.48 Here, and until the promulgation of the 2010 
HMG, harm would be presumed where a merger increased HHI by 100 
points or more and resulted in a market with an HHI above 1800.49 The 1982 
MG expressed skepticism about the existence of efficiencies,50 but the new 
market concentration approach, which was less strict than its 1968 
predecessor, appears consistent with the notion that “the substantive 
standards of illegality already assumed and accounted for merger 
efficiencies.”51 Thus, “a real sympathy to efficiencies is built into the 
Guidelines from the start.”52 
The more dramatic departure from earlier positions came when the 1984 
Merger Guidelines embraced the typical existence of merger efficiencies, 
despite the dearth of rigorous evidence underpinning that intellectual 
change.53 Although the 1984 MG did not go as far as Bork recommended in 
granting presumptive status to efficiencies in a wide range of circumstances, 
they marked a significant shift in favor of the recognition of efficiencies, 
pronouncing the view that “[t]he primary benefit of mergers to the economy 
is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competitiveness 
of firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”54 This was part of a broader 
shift from a focus on the structure of a market (as in the 1968 guidelines) to 
 
48 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 12-13. The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares 
(measured from zero to one hundred percent) across all the firms in a market. To get a sense of what 
the thresholds mean, it may be useful to recognize that this definition implies, for example, an HHI 
of 1000 for a market with 10 equal-sized firms (ten percent share each), 1667 for a market with six 
equal-sized firms, and 2500 for a market with four equal-sized firms. 
49 See 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 14-15; 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 15; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 16 (1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NNP-
GLQL] [hereinafter 1997 HMG]; 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19. 
50 See 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 29 (“Plausible efficiencies are far easier to allege than 
prove	.	.	.	.	their magnitudes would be extremely difficult to determine.”). 
51 Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 707 (2017); 
see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 107, 122 (1990) (“[A]ny [horizontal] merger that generates no synergies	.	.	.	raises price.”). 
52 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis 2 
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Competition Policy Ctr. Working Paper No. CPC00-15, 2000) (reviewing 
the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
53 See infra, Part III. 
54 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23. 
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the recognition of factors, like efficiencies and entry, that could change an 
enforcer’s understanding of potential anticompetitive outcomes.55 
Some relationship between the HHI standards for presumed harm and 
likely merger efficiencies was recognized at the time. For example, then-DOJ 
economist Frederick Warren-Bolton explained in 1985 that “the very 
existence of ‘safe harbor’ Herfindahls in the Guidelines already implies a 
‘standard deduction’ for efficiencies.”56 Two decades later, Michael Salinger, 
then-Director of the Bureau of Economics, assured the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission that “[e]fficiencies do play a key role in our 
analysis, although the way they are considered is perhaps less formal than is 
suggested by the guidelines” and that “[e]fficiencies affect the judgments we 
make even if they are not cognizable.”57 
This is not surprising. “Since absent any efficiency gains a horizontal merger 
will generally (weakly) increase prices, any merger screen that would allow some 
mergers and block others must implicitly be relying on some presumption of the 
efficiency gain that, on average, should be credited to a typical merger.”58 
Despite their claim that efficiencies are likely ubiquitous and implicit 
acceptance of a “standard efficiency credit,” the 1984 MG recognized that 
efficiencies were unlikely to cure all adverse effects of mergers in more 
concentrated settings. They placed the burden on parties to produce “clear 
and convincing evidence” of efficiencies.59 Still, it was in 1984 that the merger 
guidelines created the dynamic that led to the current approach: granting 
presumed efficiencies to mergers that do not raise particular concentration 
 
55 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 42, at 21 (“In the 1980s both the Supreme Court 
and government enforcement policy began to de-emphasize the role of pure structure and added 
other factors, including nonstructural features bearing on the risk of collusion, barriers to entry, and 
efficiencies”). In United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974), the Supreme Court held 
that market-concentration measures were not determinative in light of other market characteristics. 
56 Frederick Warren-Boulton, Merger Policy and Enforcement at the Antitrust Division: The 
Economist’s View, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 109, 112 (1985). 
57 Michael Salinger, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed Trade Comm’n, Treatment of Efficiencies in 
Merger Enforcement 2 (Nov. 17, 2005),  https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/treatment-efficiencies-merger-enforcement/051117amcstatement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TSG8-R7HH]. 
58  Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 
1163 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[I]t seems appropriate to understand an 
efficiencies defense to a merger whose suspected anticompetitive effects exceed the threshold as 
implicitly involving a claim that the merger synergies are not merely substantial but are large enough 
to notably exceed the level ordinarily presumed to exist.”); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust 
Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 10 (2010) (describing the “standard deduction” and noting that “this idea 
might lie behind the established policy of allowing most horizontal mergers without special 
showings of efficiencies.”); Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for 
Horizontal Mergers 5 (Apr. 29, 2020) (unpublished paper), http://economics.mit.edu/files/19692 
[https://perma.cc/THP8-72UR]. 
59 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23. 
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concerns, but requiring parties in cases that are fully investigated to 
demonstrate cognizable efficiencies sufficient to offset the impact of 
significant reductions in competition. 
Those burdens were further described in the 1997 revised guidelines, 
designed to “clarify how the agencies analyze efficiency claims in mergers” 
with an eye to “bring[ing] the analysis of efficiencies in mergers up-to-date.”60 
The 1997 revisions set out the now-familiar requirements that efficiencies be 
cognizable, which means that they are (1) merger-specific, (2) substantiated, 
(3) “do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service,”61 and 
(4) are sufficient to negate harm to consumers through, for example, 
preventing price increases.62 In tandem with the 1992 guidelines, the 1997 
revision also expressly replaced the requirement that efficiencies be 
demonstrated by the merging parties by clear and convincing evidence.63 
The most recent Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued in 2010.64 The 
treatment of efficiencies remained essentially the same as in 1997,65 but the 
market concentration standard for the presumption of harm was shifted 
upwards—from treating a market above an HHI of 1800 as highly 
concentrated to establishing that threshold at an HHI of 2500, and from 
treating an increase of more than one hundred points in a highly concentrated 
marketed as triggering the structural presumption, to moving to a 
requirement that the HHI increase by more than 200 points. This change was 
described as reflecting the experience of the antitrust agencies;66 retention of 
the structural presumption was made over the objection of the ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law, which “urge[d] the Agencies to remove the presumption of 
illegality keyed to the level and increase in the HHI.”67 A threshold of 2500 
 
60 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC/DOJ Announce Revised Guidelines on Efficiencies 
in Mergers 1 (Apr. 8, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1997/04/ftcdoj-
announce-revised-guidelines-efficiencies-mergers [https://perma.cc/V7JF-URFV]. 
61 1997 HMG, supra note 49, at 31. 
62 Id. 
63 Compare 1997 HMG, supra note 49, at 31 (“[T]he merging firms must substantiate efficiency 
claims	.	.	.	.”) with 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23 (stating that the Department will consider 
efficiencies “[i]f the parties to the merger establish by clear and convincing evidence that a merger 
will achieve such efficiencies”). The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines removed the “clear and 
convincing” requirement. See Table 1, infra. However, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines did 
not specify the burden placed on merging parties. 1992 HMG, supra note 24, at 30-33. 
64 2010 HMG, supra note 1. 
65 See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 702, 707 (2010) (stating that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines basically 
follow the approach of the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines on efficiencies). 
66 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 729 (2018). 
67 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Comment Letter on Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
4 (June 4, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-review-project-proposed-new-horizontal-merger-guidelines-548050-00026/5480
50-00026.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LE3-UHRR] 
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for presumptively anticompetitive mergers suggests the possibility that a 
merger resulting in four equally-sized competitors would be allowed, a long 
way from the approach of the 1968 guidelines. 
This synchronized movement toward raising the threshold for presumed 
anticompetitive harm in league with the view that efficiencies are generally 
present and need not be very large to reverse anticompetitive effects68 appears 
consistent with our characterization of the agencies acting as if each merger 
gets what we have referred to as a standard efficiency credit. That can lead to 
focusing enforcement primarily on those transactions that trigger the 
structural presumption. In other words, the magnitude of the assumed 
standard efficiency credit impacts the setting of market concentration 
standards, which logically should be lower if the agencies believed that 
efficiencies were rare rather than commonplace. 
It is worth emphasizing the Guidelines’ explicit rejection of the total 
welfare approach embraced by Williamson and Bork, and insistence that 
efficiencies must benefit actual consumers of the merged firm’s products. Thus, 
the 2010 HMG explain that “the Agencies consider whether cognizable 
efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm 
customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that 
market.”69 Indeed, “[t]he greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a 
merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must 
be passed through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger 
will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.”70 In language 
that stands in stark contrast with the Williamson-Bork view that increased 
profits to the newly-formed company should be balanced against harm to 
customers, the Agencies explained that “the antitrust laws give competition, 
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”71 
Rejecting the total welfare standard is correct and also has implications 
for current critiques of the antitrust agencies’ and courts’ approach to 
efficiencies that are discussed in Part IV. The total welfare standard can easily 
accept harm to competition as a positive outcome—not only increased profits 
to the merging firms, but even increased profits to their horizontal rivals who 
 
68 See Muris, supra note 46, at 420 (“[I]f the defendant can show the existence of nontrivial 
economies—that is in the magnitude of only one to two percent—the merger should be presumed 
to be procompetitive.”). 
69 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31. A similar stance is also embodied in the 2006 HMG 
Commentary. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2006 55, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/801216/download 
[https://perma.cc/TDT2-EVKU] (“As noted in section 4 of the Guidelines, the Agencies seek to 
determine ‘whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential 
to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.’”). 
70 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31. 
71 Id. 
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are freed from the pressure of competition.72 By contrast, asking whether 
efficiencies negate the potential anticompetitive harm from a merger 
appropriate focuses on whether efficiencies are passed through to consumers 
(in the merger of two firms that sell to consumers).73 
II. EFFICIENCIES AND ECONOMICS 
Economics can help guide the appropriate treatment of potential 
efficiencies in horizontal merger enforcement by providing insight on two 
questions: (i) what should qualify as “efficiencies” under antitrust law, and (ii) 
how prevalent are realized efficiencies in horizontal mergers? 
While Williamson and Bork fundamentally altered the debate over 
efficiencies in merger review, their arguments were at their heart based on 
theoretical possibilities that have in large part found their way into current 
analysis. As we discuss below, the empirical foundation for those possibilities 
is at best shaky. 
A. What Constitutes an Efficiency? 
As noted earlier, to be cognizable, the 2010 HMG require that efficiencies 
be merger-specific; verifiable; not the fruits of anticompetitive outcomes; and, 
if offered in defense of an otherwise anticompetitive merger, ultimately 
sufficient to offset all potential anticompetitive outcomes from the merger.74 
Although the guidelines are not binding on the judiciary, courts have tended to 
articulate the same approach towards identifying and analyzing efficiencies.75 
 
72 See Steven Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: 
The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 351-53 (2010) (noting that 
the aggregate welfare standard is satisfied where cost savings from production outweigh deadweight 
loss stemming from higher consumer prices). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that a 
merger can reverse its potentially harmful effects only if it creates adequate downward price 
pressure); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the 
post-merger firm must “provide clear evidence showing that the merger will result in efficiencies 
that will offset anticompetitive effects and ultimately benefit consumers”). 
74 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 1-2. For purposes of this Article, we rely upon the analysis of 
efficiencies as stated in the 2010 HMG, focused on whether the effect of a proposed transaction “may 
be substantially to lessen competition.” Id. at 1. That is, the existence of efficiencies may be used to 
show that the effect of a transaction would not be to substantially lessen competition. See also 
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 704 (noting the adoption of an “efficiency defense” in the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
75 Lawyers and courts continue to debate whether an efficiencies defense even exists. See, e.g., 
Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that the congressional proscription of mergers 
that substantially lessen competition is not overridable by the presence of price decreases); FTC v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (positing that district courts often use an 
efficiencies defense although the Supreme Court has not authorized its use and the defense often 
fails when invoked). 
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These standards are well-aligned with the economics of ensuring that 
mergers do not cause anticompetitive harm in the markets served by the 
merging firms. There is broad agreement that an efficiency must be resource 
saving, that is, an improvement in the economics of value creation, such as a 
reduction in the real resources required to produce a given product, or an 
improvement in the product that is achieved without the need for increased 
resources.76 Economic efficiencies are distinguished from purely financial 
gains by excluding pecuniary effects, and specifically excluding cost 
reductions that accrue from an increase of market power.77 “Revenue 
synergies” that derive from the ability to raise prices following the 
elimination of competition between firms are evidence of competitive harm, 
even if they motivate Wall Street dealmakers, CEOs, and shareholders. In 
the words of the 2010 HMG, efficiencies “enhance the merged firm’s ability 
and incentive to compete”;78 they do not enhance the merged firm’s ability 
and incentive to harm competition. 
Cost reductions arising from productivity gains exemplify this standard. 
Consider a hypothetical merger of two small beer manufacturers that each 
have one brewery; one is located in the Southeast and the other in the 
Northeast. A merger would permit them to produce both beers at each 
brewery, substantially reducing transportation costs to each brand’s more 
distant markets. Such a merger could, in theory, lead to lower delivered prices 
and higher output, if cost reductions were sufficiently large and the likely 
diminution of competition post-merger was sufficiently small such that the 
new firm’s most profitable strategy was to expand sales.79 The 2010 HMG tells 
 
76 E.g., Williamson, supra note 33, at 19 (noting the “appropriate” “distinction” drawn by Justice 
Douglas in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) between 
“economies	.	.	.	merely pecuniary rather than real”); Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 704, 709 (noting 
that mergers are permitted when they lead to cost savings product improvements). 
77 See Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 349, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett C.J. concurring) (“[T]here is no 
dispute that, to have any legal relevance, a proffered efficiency cannot arise from anticompetitive effects.”). 
78 HMG 2010, supra note 1, at 29. 
79 Even if efficiencies are large enough to offset the unilateral incentive to raise prices, they 
may be dwarfed by the possibility of increased coordination with other rivals post-merger. In such 
cases, the merger should be blocked. For an illustration of this danger, see Nathan H. Miller & 
Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the Miller-Coors Joint Venture, 85 
ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1788-89 (2017), which performs an ex post empirical analysis of the 2008 
SABMiller-Molson Coors joint venture that finds evidence of increased price due to enhanced 
coordinated effects. The joint venture had a fact pattern akin to this hypothetical. The Department 
of Justice (DOJ) cited “substantial and credible savings that [would] significantly reduce the 
companies’ costs of producing and distributing beer” in its closing statement clearing the merger. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on 
its Decision to Close its Investigation of the Joint Venture Between SABMiller PLC and Molson 
Coors Brewing Company (June 5, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/
press_releases/2008/233845.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NUJ-PLHC]. Miller and Weinberg find that 
despite significant realized efficiencies from the joint venture, prices increased following its close due 
 
2020] Dichotomous Treatment of Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers 1959 
us that “efficiencies resulting from shifting production among facilities 
formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the 
incremental cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification 
and are less likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output.”80 
Improved incentives to compete efficiently, such as the ability to produce 
more or higher quality output with the same level of cost, are also recognized 
as efficiencies.81 In the interest of simplicity, we refer to cost-reducing 
efficiencies, but implicitly incorporate enhanced product quality, innovation 
or other potential efficiency benefits. 
Not every merger-related cost reduction is an efficiency. So-called 
“pecuniary” benefits, such as tax savings, do not qualify.82 As the DOJ has 
explained: “Economics distinguishes between a ‘real’ savings and a 
‘pecuniary’ savings. The former enlarges the pie shared by all members of 
society. The latter enlarges one slice by shrinking one or more other slices.”83 
Because they do not result in resource savings but are merely transfers, 
pecuniary savings are not properly recognized as “efficiencies,” even if they 
trigger a financial gain to the merging firm.84 
 
to its facilitation of greater tacit collusion between Miller-Coors and Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI). 
The DOJ cited these coordinated effects in its 2013 complaint and settlement of ABI’s proposed 
acquisition of Grupo Modelo. See Complaint at 13-14, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, 
No. CV 13-127(RWR), 2013 WL 7018607 (D.D.C. 2013) (referencing ABI’s “strategic plan for pricing 
in the United States that reads like a how-to manual for successful price coordination”); see also 
Competitive Impact Statement at 7, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, No. CV 13-
127(RWR), 2013 WL 7018607 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[L]arge brewers engage in significant levels of tacit 
coordination and that coordination has reduced competition and increased prices.”). 
80 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31. 
81 See infra Part I. Credibly quantifying expected merger-specific quality improvement is even 
more difficult than predicting price effects and should be subject to a high bar. See FTC v. H.J. 
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing, but ultimately rejecting, claimed quality-
enhancing efficiencies). 
82 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION §	970e (2019); see also FTC v. Proctor & 
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 604 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that cognizable efficiencies “must 
be shown in what economists label ‘real’ terms, that is in terms of resources applied to the 
accomplishment of the objective”); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 349 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (requiring “what economists label ‘real’ terms”); Williamson, supra note 33, at 24 (“The 
relevant effects are those which take the form of real rather than pecuniary economies.”).  
83 Corrected Brief of Appellees The United States of America and Plaintiff States at 59, United 
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1493); See also Warren-Boulton, supra note 
56, at 112-13 (distinguishing “real” efficiencies, such as a merger that results in greater output using 
fewer inputs, from pecuniary efficiencies, including tax gains and the creation of monopsony power). 
84 This article does not discuss efficiencies in the context of vertical mergers. It is worth 
pointing out, however, that the antitrust agencies have proposed that efficiencies claimed in vertical 
mergers be assessed under the same standards as in horizontal mergers. See 2020 Draft Vertical 
Guidelines, supra note 2 , at 9. But, there is a considerable debate about the extent to which claimed 
elimination of double marginalization should be scrutinized in the same manner as efficiencies 
(putting aside, for the moment, whether elimination of double marginalization meets the definition 
 
1960 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1941 
Of particular importance are transactions in which merging parties claim 
benefits that arise from the acquisition of upstream market power.85 The 2010 
HMG explain that efficiencies cannot be the product of “anticompetitive 
reductions in output or service.”86 As explained by Scott Hemphill and 
Nancy Rose, 
[S]avings achieved through the exercise of increased classical monopsony 
power or bargaining leverage are premised on a reduction in competition. 
Under existing law developed mainly in the analysis of output markets, such 
‘benefits’ are not cognizable efficiencies. Such a savings does not count as an 
antitrust benefit, even if it is passed through to downstream purchasers.87 
This argument is featured in the DOJ’s 2016 challenge to the proposed merger 
of two of health insurers, Anthem and Cigna. There, the merging parties 
claimed their expected reductions in payments to providers such as doctors 
and hospitals would be delivered as a benefit to their customers in the form 
of lower prices. Disagreeing, the DOJ alleged that “Anthem’s defense that its 
acquisition of Cigna will enable it to lower reimbursement rates confirms 
rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose and effect of the 
acquisition.”88 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed the DOJ position, concluding that the exercise of 
monopsony power is as inimical to competition as is the exercise of monopoly 
power and “a proffered efficiency cannot arise from anticompetitive effects.”89 
A cognizable efficiency further must reduce the incremental production 
cost (or increase the incremental product value) in order to undo the upward 
pricing pressure that results from the diminution of competition between the 
 
of an efficiency). See id. at 7 (noting that the Department of Justice will generally rely on the parties 
to demonstrate the elimination of double marginalization); Becerra et al., supra note 2, at 21-23 
(claiming that claims of elimination of double marginalization should be analyzed under the general 
standard applicable to efficiencies); Jonathan Sallet, The Future of Vertical Mergers and The Thing 
Called ‘EDM’”, THE WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH: COMPETITIVE EDGE (Mar. 
19, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-the-future-of-vertical-mergers-and-the-
thing-called-edm/ [https://perma.cc/XUF8-X7RV] (“[T]he antitrust agencies need to clarify their 
final [vertical merger] guidelines to make plain that claims of EDM are to be presented and assessed 
the same as any other claimed procompetitive benefit.”). 
85 For further discussion of mergers of competing buyers and potential sources of efficiencies 
in such transactions, see 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
86 Id. at 30. 
87 Hemphill & Rose, supra note 8, at 2082. 
88 Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum on the Buy-Side Case at 4, United States v. Anthem, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 345  (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1493) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978)), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/920331/download 
[https://perma.cc/B964-9YQM]. 
89 Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 369 (Millet, J., concurring); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 82, at §	975i (discounting a claimed efficiency that “simply transfers income from supplier to 
purchaser without any resource savings.”). 
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merging firms. Purely fixed cost savings, even if realized, may increase a firm’s 
profitability, but generally do not induce the firm to increase output or reduce 
prices, as those decisions depend only on the firm’s marginal costs, not its 
average costs. Such fixed cost reductions would not offset the competitive 
harm and would not be considered a cognizable efficiency.90 
This understanding of what is an efficiency leaves the question: How 
frequent and of what magnitude in horizontal mergers are such efficiencies? 
We turn next to that discussion. 
B. What is the Economic Evidence on Efficiencies? 
It is tempting to infer that the embrace of efficiencies in 1984 rested on a 
foundation of rigorous empirical evidence that merger motivations and effects 
were dominated by efficiencies. That would be wrong. The economic 
scholarship of that period on merger efficiencies seems to have been at first 
premised on theoretical discourse on their possibility, even then often heavily 
caveated, as in Williamson’s 1968 work.91 Some, like Harold Demsetz, 
observed that an empirical correlation of profits and firm size in concentrated 
markets could as easily arise from efficiencies of scale as from market power.92 
That does not prove that mergers induce efficiencies. But those arguments 
seem to have quickly been transformed from a caution about theoretical costs 
of proposals to break up large firms where economies of scale are important to 
the logical fallacy that this implied merger enforcement was too stringent.93 
 
90 See Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 731 (noting that the 2010 HMG require that significant 
efficiencies be proven and passed on to consumers such that the post-merger price is no higher than 
the pre-merger price). A fixed cost reduction that facilitates entry or innovation may have the 
potential to offset competitive harm in the longer-run, but there is scant theoretical or empirical 
reason to expect merger-induced overhead or fixed cost reductions to have that character. Moreover, 
the delayed impact and greater uncertainty of benefits resting on future entry appropriately lead 
these to be down-weighted in merger analysis. See 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 4 (“Explicit or implicit 
evidence that the merging parties intend to raise prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product 
quality or variety, withdraw products or delay their introduction, or curtail research and 
development efforts after the merger, or explicit or implicit evidence that the ability to engage in 
such conduct motivated the merger, can be highly informative in evaluating the likely effects of a 
merger.”). Merger-related reductions in some fixed costs also could exacerbate rather than offset 
competitive harm over time; for example, reductions in research and development expenditures may 
reduce future innovations. 
91 E.g., Williamson, supra note 33. 
92 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 5-9 (1973) (documenting higher rates of return for larger rather than smaller firms in highly 
concentrated 3-digit industries, and increases in this gap as concentration rises, and arguing these 
are consistent with the competitive growth of efficient firms). 
93 Id. at 9 (concluding these correlations “must increase our doubts, however slightly, about the 
beneficial effects of an active deconcentration or anti-merger policy”). In equilibrating deconcentration 
(divestiture) and anti-merger policy, Demsetz commits the logical and economic fallacy of inferring 
that if greater efficiency makes firms large, it must be that making firms large by merger makes them 
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The appeal of the Chicago School’s simple assertion of the inevitability of 
competitive markets captivated not only Bork, but increasingly many antitrust 
enforcers and the judiciary. Unfortunately, the growing belief in the ubiquity 
of merger efficiencies by the enforcement and judicial community was at 
increasing odds with economic evidence. As empirically-trained economists 
focused further on what data revealed about the relationship between mergers 
and efficiencies, the results cast considerable doubt on post-merger benefits. 
As discussed at length by Professor Hovenkamp, “the empirical evidence is 
not unanimous, however, it strongly suggests that current merger policy tends 
to underestimate harm, overestimate efficiencies, or some combination of the 
two.”94 The business literature is even more skeptical. As management 
consultant McKinsey & Company reported in 2010: “Most mergers are 
doomed from the beginning. Anyone who has researched merger success rates 
knows that roughly 70 percent of mergers fail.”95 
Two strands of the economic literature are particularly informative on the 
question of what our working assumption should be about the prevalence and 
economic significance of efficiencies in mergers, particularly horizontal mergers. 
First are merger retrospectives that analyze ex post price, or more rarely, 
product quality, impacts from mergers. If merger-induced efficiencies—or 
similar effects from easy entry, product repositioning, powerful customers, and 
the like96—are sufficient to offset any reduction in competition, prices should 
be stable or falling following a merger, all else equal.97 Evidence that 
consummated mergers often are associated with price increases or quality 
 
efficient. Those citing to Demsetz as proof of efficiencies favoring mergers succumb to this fallacy and 
overlook the considerably more modest conclusion Demsetz draws from his evidence. 
94 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 726, 727-29. For a review of the extensive literature cited in 
his discussion, see id. at 728-730 nn.146-53. 
95 MCKINSEY & CO., PERSPECTIVES ON MERGER INTEGRATION 11 (2010), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/~/media/1002A11EEA40458
99124B917EAC7404C.ashx [https://perma.cc/TC7U-VJ7U]. 
96 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 20-22, 27-29 (discussing unilateral effects from mergers, the impact 
of a powerful buyer resulting from a merger, and entry barriers to new firms entering industries). 
97 If the merger improves product quality or customer services, this statement would apply to 
quality-adjusted prices that are stable or falling. This often is difficult to measure well, and it can be 
even more difficult to establish what the outcome would have been in the absence of the merger, 
what economists refer to as the counterfactual state and lawyers frequently call the hypothetical and 
what both often refer to as the “but for” world. Moreover, the assertion that an increase in output 
accompanied by rising prices is proof of greater consumer value is too frequently misunderstood or 
misapplied. For an example of the Court’s erroneous argument, see Ohio v. American Express Co., in 
which the court held that the fact that total credit card transactions increased 30% between 2008 and 
2013 demonstrated that American Express antisteering provisions neither restricted output nor 
raised price. 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018); see also id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (correcting the majority’s 
error by stating “the relevant restriction of output is as compared with a hypothetical world in which 
the restraint was not present and prices were lower	.	.	. a comparison between reality and a 
hypothetical state of affairs”). 
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degradation is inconsistent with the prevalence of sufficient merger efficiencies. 
Stable or falling prices do not themselves prove that efficiencies or other 
antidotes to reduced competition are common. But if merger enforcement is 
effective, mergers that reduce competition and lead to higher prices should be 
rare, regardless of whether there generally are merger efficiencies. 
Read in this light, results from the merger retrospective literature provide 
little support for a belief in the prevalence of substantial efficiencies. 
Published retrospective analyses tend to focus on markets in which detailed 
price data are readily available to economists, which makes them far from a 
random sample of all industries, let alone of all mergers.98 Despite this 
limitation, there is a rich literature studying consummated mergers across a 
diverse set of industries, including airlines, appliances, beer, various 
consumer package goods, electric utilities, hospitals, industrial products, 
insurance, mobile telephone service, petroleum refining and retail gasoline, 
publishing, retailing, and many others.99 A common theme emerges from 
these studies: consummated horizontal mergers, particularly in concentrated 
markets, frequently are associated with consumer losses, and infrequently are 
associated with consumer benefits. This is consistent with market power 
effects dominating any potential efficiency gains, or no efficiencies at all. 
The most thorough meta-analysis of the horizontal merger retrospective 
literature is provided by John Kwoka, who reviewed more than 200 
retrospective studies of horizontal transactions and compares results across a 
subset curated to ensure quality control and comparability.100 Of the 101 
product prices analyzed in the individual merger studies, sixty-six 
experienced increases averaging 9.5%, while 35 experienced price declines 
 
98 This is what economists call “sample selection.” The data are not drawn from all possible 
mergers, but only those not successfully deterred or blocked by antitrust enforcement. This selection 
would tend to bias results toward finding no price increases. There may be a second source of 
potential selection bias, if the mergers economists choose to study are not a random selection of all 
relevant mergers. These limit the inferences one can draw for the entire universe of possible 
mergers. In theory, there also could be publication bias if “null” results are less likely to be published 
by journals, but this is unlikely to tilt the published literature toward either price increases or price 
decreases, since either finding would be of substantial interest. 
99 Many of these are cited and discussed in numerous meta-analyses of merger retrospectives. 
See, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 87-91 (2015) (showing the results from a curated set of studies meeting 
certain quality criteria that include single-merger price effect estimates for 49 mergers between 1976 
and 2006, with most in the 1990s, and 19 additional multi-merger studies covering hundreds of 
mergers between 1980 and 2004); Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Did 
Robert Bork Understate the Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. ECON. S67, 
S77 (2014) (analyzing “49 distinct studies examining mergers taking place in 21 industries published 
over the last 30 years”); Malcolm B. Coate, A Retrospective on Merger Retrospectives in the United States, 
12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 209, 209 (2016) (estimating challenge probabilities arising from 
merger retrospectives using the FTC’s enforcement activity). 
100 KWOKA, supra note 99, at 6-7. 
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averaging 3.3%.101 Seventeen of the industry multi-merger studies reported 
price estimates, averaging a 5.4% increase across the entire group.102 These 
findings, and the weight of evidence from this broad literature suggest greater 
skepticism toward the assertion of ubiquitous horizontal merger efficiencies, 
and particularly that they are sufficient generally to offset competitive harm 
near the enforcement margin.103 While some recent papers have questioned 
whether efficiencies might emerge over longer periods of time, their results 
suggest little reason to believe that accounting for longer-run effects would 
reverse the conclusion of the overall retrospective literature.104 
A second strand of literature attempts to measure directly the efficiency 
changes associated with mergers. Ex post merger efficiencies are challenging to 
measure and understudied, but a small but growing economics literature has 
attempted the feat. A number of early econometric analyses of ex post merger 
performance across sectors used the Federal Trade Commission’s 1974-1977 
manufacturing Line of Business database. An example is Dennis Mueller’s 
(1985) study that reports substantial declines in market shares for acquired 
units, suggesting reduced competitiveness and hence competition post-
merger.105 Higher post-merger profitability, even when accurately measured, 
 
101 Id. at 96. 
102 Id. at 147. But see Michael Vita & F. David Osinski, John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, 
and Remedies: A Critical Review, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 377-81 (2018) (criticizing Kwoka’s 
methodology, which does not provide standard errors on these estimates, making it difficult to 
determine their precision); Coate supra note 99 (identifying authors who criticize Kwoka’s work as 
uninformative on the effectiveness of merger enforcement, due, for example, to the 
unrepresentativeness of the mergers studied). Most of these critiques are not directly relevant to 
the question of merger efficiencies sufficient to offset anticompetitive price effects. 
103 See also Coate, supra note 99, at 209 (observing that estimated price effects tend to line up 
with the probability of a merger challenge, with price increases most likely in markets that are very 
likely to be challenged based on structural analysis). 
104 For an example of a paper arguing that price effects after the first year may be reversed in 
the second year post-merger, see Franco Mariuzzo & Peter L. Ormosi, Post-merger Price Dynamics 
Matters, So Why Do Merger Retrospectives Ignore It?, 55 REV. INDUS. ORG. 403, 419 (2019). Another 
study, of two railroad mergers, shows large increases in the price of grain shipments in the year 
following the merger, with quite variable subsequent price changes, and a long-term trend of slightly 
higher prices based on traditional differences-in-differences estimates. See Clifford Winston, Vikram 
Maheshri & Scott M. Dennis, Long-Run Effects of Mergers: The Case of U.S. Western Railroads, 54 J.L. 
& ECON. 275 (2011) (explaining that structural model estimates that use of different counterfactuals 
suggest relatively small adverse long-run impacts on consumer surplus for one merger). One recent 
study claiming large dynamic efficiencies is based not on post-merger data but on a calibrated 
theoretical model. Yonghong An & Wei Zhao, Dynamic Efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas Merger, 50 RAND J. ECON. 666, 666 (2019) (finding that “the merger led to lower prices” 
and “net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion,” but these are results using a 
simulated econometric model to infer counterfactual impacts of the merger, and are not based on 
any data on actual Boeing costs pre- or post-merger). 
105 Dennis C. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259, 259 (1985) 
(analyzing data on 5-digit product classes for units of 209 of the largest 1000 manufacturing 
companies, and finding that by 1972 an unacquired business retained 88% of its 1950 market share, 
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does not distinguish between market power and efficiencies as a source, but 
lower post-merger profitability suggests that mergers fail, on net, on both 
dimensions. While the mergers in David Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer’s 1987 
study are disproportionately from the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s, 
they conclude “the combination of evidence covering the horizontal subset	of 
our	.	.	.	sample	suggests that on average horizontal acquisitions, like 
conglomerate mergers, were followed by deteriorating profit performance.” 106 
Roughly contemporaneous studies of horizontal mergers in Europe, which had 
less stringent antitrust enforcement at the time, reached similarly pessimistic 
conclusions on post-merger performance.107 Richard Caves, writing in 1989, 
concluded that “traditional modes of investigating [mergers’] ex post 
productivity sustain a fragile case for [efficiencies] at best, and several 
important recent investigations provide strongly negative evidence.”108 
A handful of more recent studies have estimated efficiency effects from 
production-function based analyses that include more recent mergers. Only 
those that examine cost efficiencies are informative on the efficiency question 
relevant to merger enforcement policy; “revenue productivity,” financial 
returns on assets, or similar measures intermingle the effects of price 
increases with cost savings, and without careful work to disentangle those 
two, cannot inform the debate on whether merger-specific efficiencies offset 
increases in market power.109 This work ranges from studies of a small number 
 
in contrast to only 18% for an acquired business). Note that declining market share could also be a 
manifestation of market power, exercised through output restriction and higher prices. 
106 DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY 224 (1987); see also id. at 76-77 (analyzing 2955 lines of business for the 1000 largest 
manufacturing companies in 1950, of which 2238 had been involved in an acquisition). 
107 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1980) (describing the results of a collection of studies of mergers in 
Europe and the U.S., which found that merger effects on profitability are at best mixed and tend toward 
negative); RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, Id. , at 220 n.7 (citing references that provide examples). 
108 Richard E. Caves, Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs. Hindsight, 7 
INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 151, 152 (1989). See also Lars-Hendrick Röller, Johan Stennik & Frank 
Verboven, Efficiency Gains from Mergers 9, 43 (Discussion Paper 00-09, Aug. 2000) (describing that 
“the impact of efficiency gains on price is more than offset by increased market power, at least in the 
cases studied in the economics literature” and “there seems to be no support for a general 
presumption that mergers create efficiency gains” although they do sometimes do so). 
109 Examples of studies that focus on measures of revenue productivity include Vojislav 
Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, The Market for Corporate Assets: Who Engages in Mergers and Asset 
Sales and Are There Efficiency Gains?, 56 J. FIN. 2019, 2040 (2001) (estimating predicted output using 
a regression of log of the total value of shipments) and Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin 
Yurtoglu & Christine Zulehner, The Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, 21 INT’L. J. 
INDUS. ORG. 625 (2003). Gugler et al. measure revenues and profits and argue that mergers that 
increase both must increase what they term efficiencies. Their empirical analysis of more than 2700 
mergers worldwide leads them to conclude: “[i]f one categorizes mergers that increase market power 
or that reduce efficiency as welfare reducing, then a majority of the mergers taking place around the 
world over the last 15 years appear to be welfare reducing.” Id. at 651. 
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of mergers in a particular well-defined industry to those aggregating evidence 
from hundreds of mergers across broad sectors and time periods. 
One of the most expansive studies, by Bruce Blonigen and Justin Pierce, 
uses plant-level data from the 1997-2007 Census of Manufacturing to 
separately identify mark-up and productivity effects from plant-level 
acquisitions across the entire manufacturing sector. They find that while post-
merger mark-ups rise considerably, particularly for horizontal acquisitions, 
there is no evidence of statistically or economically significant productivity 
gains: “evidence for increased average markups from M&A activity is 
significant and robust. In contrast, we find little evidence for plant- or firm-
level productivity effects from M&A activity on average, nor for other 
efficiency gains often cited as possible from M&A activity	.	.	.	.”110 A similar 
conclusion is reached by John Kwoka and Michael Pollitt in their study of 
electric utility mergers.111 Robert Kulnick’s analysis of mergers in the ready-
mix concrete industry over 1977-1992 finds no evidence of productivity 
increases in plants acquired prior to the 1982 MG, and increased productivity 
that is insufficient to offset increased market power, resulting in higher prices, 
for horizontal mergers after 1982.112 Overall, the results from efforts to 
directly measure merger-induced efficiencies provide little support for the 
propositions that horizontal mergers are either motivated by or effective in 
producing significant economic efficiency gains. 
The empirical designs, markets, and mergers studied vary widely across 
the empirical economic studies that attempt to measure ex post merger 
effects. The results reveal heterogeneity in outcomes, and the limitations of 
this literature suggest that the debate would benefit from further empirical 
work to both refine the analysis and synthesize the findings. But the 
conclusions of this broad literature cast significant doubt on an assumption 
of widespread prevalence of merger-related efficiencies sufficient to overcome 
the adverse effects of increased market power. The Guidelines may be correct 
in noting the potential for merger-related efficiencies to improve economic 
 
110 Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and 
Efficiency 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016). 
111 See John Kwoka & Michael Pollitt, Do Mergers Improve Efficiency? Evidence from Restructuring 
the US Electric Power Sector, 28 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 645, 646, 654 (2010) (providing an analysis of 
seventy-three electric utility mergers in 1994–2004 and indicating “some of the strongest evidence 
against the theory of efficient mergers and the market for corporate control,” in the finding that 
“target firms’ post-efficiency actually declines” and “[a]cquiring firms record little or no gain to offset 
these efficiency losses by the acquired firms”). 
112 Robert B. Kulick, Ready-to-Mix: Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity 35 (U.S. Census 
Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. CES-WP- 17-38, 2017). The 1982 MG introduced 
HHI analysis and new, less stringent, concentration thresholds, replacing the stricter approach to 
merger enforcement taken in 1968. See supra, Table 1; supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
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outcomes, but it appears that they have been far too optimistic in believing 
these are in fact realized as a “primary benefit of mergers.”113 
III. THE MANY: MERGERS THAT DON’T GET A SECOND LOOK 
As we have seen, assumptions about the likely existence and impact of 
efficiencies are embedded in the very definition of anticompetitive harm 
likely to be caused by horizontal mergers.114 In this Part we consider the 
implication that, as a result, some horizontal mergers that should be fully 
investigated are not.115 
Under the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act,116 mergers and acquisitions meeting 
financial thresholds must notify the federal antitrust agencies of their intent 
to consummate their transactions, thus triggering the opportunity for agency 
review.117 For example, in fiscal year 2018, the most recent year for which data 
is available, 2,028 notices were filed.118 Early termination was granted in 1,170, 
or 58%, of the transactions, leaving 42% potentially available for a full Second 
 
113 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 29. 
114 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 709 (stating that “[t]oday, the view held by the Agencies and 
expressed in the Merger Guidelines is that most mergers are socially beneficial because they lead to 
cost reductions or improved output” and “[a]s a result, a background analysis about efficiencies is 
built into the initial analysis”). 
115 A particularly important practical problem needs to be confronted at the outset. The antitrust 
agencies need greater resources to do their jobs. As noted above, resource allocation may be an 
important reason for the treatment of some, or even many, of these mergers. KADES, supra note 11. 
116 See supra Section II.A (explaining the changes to antitrust enforcement wrought by the 
Hart–Scott–Rodino Act). 
117 On occasion, the federal antitrust agencies seek to dissolve consummated mergers. See, e.g., In 
re Otto Bock HealthCare N. Am., Inc., Docket No. 9378, 1 (FTC Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0231/otto-bock-healthcarefreedom-innovations 
[https://perma.cc/EK4K-25J9] (“[T]he Commission addresses a host of issues that may be particularly 
salient in consummated mergers, such as whether an agreement to ‘hold separate’ the acquired assets 
eliminated anticompetitive effects and whether a proposed divestiture absolved the merging parties of 
liability.”); J. THOMAS ROSCH, FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMMATED MERGER CHALLENGES—
THE PAST IS NEVER DEAD 2-6 (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/consummated-merger-challenges-past-never-dead/120329springmeeting
speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7F8-3J8U] (discussing premerger notification filing regulations). 
118 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2018 5 n.9, app. A [hereinafter 2018 HSR REPORT] (describing “Adjusted 
Transactions In Which A Second Request Could Have Been Issued” which refers to the number of 
transactions eligible for a second request. It is a subset of the total transactions reported and excludes 
transactions that were eligible for a list of preliminary exemptions or were otherwise withdrawn). 
We treat this adjusted number as the universe of applications for the purpose of our analysis. 
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Request investigation.119 For present purposes, we assume that all grants of 
early termination were appropriate.120 
Of the applications eligible for a Second Request in 2018, only 5.2% 
received a Second Request.121 The average between 2007 and 2018 was higher, 
at 8.5% per year, but in none of these years did more than 11% receive a full 
investigation.122 Indeed, while the number of eligible transactions has been 
steadily increasing over the past six years, the absolute number of Second 
Request investigations has remained largely flat.123 
The impact of this is illustrated in Figure 2. From the end of the 2007-
2009 recession to 2018, the percent of overall eligible transactions that 
received a second request has decreased at an average of 0.22% per year. This 
resulted in a drop by roughly half in the probability of a Second Request over 
this period, from a high of 10.8% in 2009 to just 5.2% in 2018. A similar drop 














119 Id. at app. A; see infra Table A1, Appendix. The percentage of transactions that were not 
granted early termination (and thus eligible for full-blown investigations) averaged 38% between 
2007 and 2018. 
120 It is impossible to know how many early terminations are appropriately granted, making 
the assumption that all are correctly a conservative one. Even with this favorable assumption, which 
significantly lowers the universe of applications eligible for a Second Request, the percentage of 
eligible mergers that were fully investigated averages only 8.5% for the relevant period. Infra Table 
A2, Appendix. An even lower percentage results from comparing all of the HSR transactions 
(including early terminations) to the percentage of Second Requests. Second Requests are issued 
for only between 2.2% to 4.5% of total transactions. Infra Table A2, Appendix. 
121 See infra Table A2, Appendix. The decision to issue a Second Request is typically informed 
by a preliminary investigation. There is no current public data available on the number of 
preliminary investigations opened in a year. 
122 Infra Table A2, Appendix. 
123 Infra Table A2, Appendix. In 2010, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law told the antitrust 
agencies that “most transactions, even those that combine competitors, ultimately are not challenged, 
and often are not even extensively investigated.” ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 67, at 2. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Transactions Receiving Second Requests as 
Portion of Total Transactions and of Eligible Transactions after  
Early Termination Review, 2007–2018, by Year124 
 
 
In deciding whether to initiate a full-fledged investigation, the agencies 
consider the degree of competitive threat that a merger is likely to pose. For 
example, agencies commonly interview business customers to assess their 
reaction to a proposed merger between companies that make commercial sales 
(for example, sale of office supplies to businesses). Such early-stage reviews 
 
124 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 6 [hereinafter 2016 HSR REPORT] (presenting the percentage of 
transactions resulting in second requests for all fiscal years between 2007 and 2016); id. at app. A 
(presenting the number of transactions eligible for second requests, the number of transactions 
requesting early termination, number of transactions not granted early termination requests, and 
number of transactions in which a second request was issued for all fiscal years between 2007 and 2016); 
2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 6 (presenting the percentage of transactions resulting in second 
requests for all fiscal years between 2009 and 2018); id. at app. A (presenting the number of transactions 
eligible for second requests, the number of transactions requesting early termination, number of 
transactions not granted early termination requests, and number of transactions in which a second 
request was issued for all fiscal years between 2009 and 2018). The percentage of second request-eligible 
transactions not granted early termination in which second requests were issued was calculated by 
removing the number of transactions that were granted an early termination request from the total 
number of second request-eligible transactions, then dividing the number of second requests made in 
each year by resulting number of second request-eligible transactions not granted early termination in 
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typically inquire into the merging parties’ respective market share and, to the 
extent possible, apply the market concentration standards established by the 
2010 HMG to assess whether a proposed merger is likely to harm 
competition.125 Despite the admonition of the 2010 HMG that mergers 
falling short of the structural presumption may nonetheless create a risk of 
competitive harm, such mergers seem to garner little attention.126 
In their informational requests that precede the decision whether to open 
a full investigation, the agencies do seek information about efficiencies. For 
example, the HSR filing requires merging parties to include then-existing 
efficiencies/synergies documents.127 The Department of Justice further seeks 
 
125 As discussed above, the 2010 HMG provides that mergers resulting in highly concentrated 
markets, which are defined as having an HHI above 2500, and in which the merger would cause an 
increase of more than 200 points “will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.” 2010 HMG, 
supra note 1, at 19. This is the so-called structural presumption, which the agencies state “may be 
rebutted by persuasive evidence that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power” and that traces 
its origin back to United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. Id.; supra notes 29-31 and accompanying 
text. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structures, and 
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018) (arguing that the structural presumption is strongly 
supported by economic theory and evidence and suggesting ways to strengthen the presumption). 
126 Markets with an HHI between 1500 and 2500 are “moderately concentrated” and mergers 
resulting in a moderately concentrated market that increase HHI by more than 100 points 
“potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.” 2010 HMG, supra 
note 1, at 19. The information available in public reports and our understanding of the internal 
review processes suggest that moderately concentrated markets do not often trigger Second 
Requests. See, e.g., 2016 HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at app. A; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 app. A, 
[hereinafter 2017 HSR REPORT]; 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at app. A (demonstrating the 
relatively low rate of second requests relative to the overall number of transactions); see also Coate, 
supra note 99, at 13, 19, 36 tbl.5 (briefly describing the merger catalog analysis, explaining the author’s 
use of merger data to analyze the number of pre-merger rivals and the Herfindahl statistics, and 
demonstrating the significantly lower rate of challenges of transactions in markets with five or more 
rivals with HHI figures of less than 3000). Mergers that result in a highly concentrated market but 
without an increase of HHI of more than 200 are to receive the same scrutiny, although it is not 
clear that they do. See 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that “[m]ergers resulting in highly 
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points 
potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny”). 
127 See ITEM 4(C)TIP SHEET, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2012), https://www.ftc. 
gov/sites/default/files/attachments/hsr-resources/4ctipsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS6R-NNJC] 
(analyzing competition factors); Item 4(d) Tip Sheet, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program/hsr-resources/pno-guidance-item-4d [https://perma. 
cc/ZTD2-QEHF] (last visited May 12, 2020) (discussing synergies); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. 3, at 34 (5th ed. 2012). Per the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Manual, 
For proposed merger investigations, staff should discuss the transaction itself 
(including any complaints received or concern expressed in the press); theory(ies) of 
competitive harm; possible product markets; possible geographic markets; best 
estimate of market shares; ease or difficulty of entry and potential barriers; possible 
efficiencies; the significance of the matter (including any unusual reasons to pursue or 
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evidence that validates claimed efficiencies,128 and the FTC encourages firms 
to provide evidence that claimed efficiencies are cognizable.129 
Even still, antitrust agencies spend little time formally analyzing the 
existence of efficiencies before deciding whether to issue a Second Request 
for a simple reason—detailed information sufficient to support an analysis is 
seldom available at that stage.130 One legal commentator suggests that the 
FTC lawyers are more skeptical of efficiencies claims than are their economist 
colleagues and that “[t]o the extent the agencies ultimately cite efficiencies 
considerations in clearing mergers, antitrust practitioners report that they are 
often treated as ‘icing on the cake’ in cases where there are no serious concerns 
about anticompetitive effects.”131 
In fact, a review of FTC merger investigations from 1989-2016 shows a very 
strong relationship between challenging a horizontal merger and market 
structure. Not surprisingly, mergers to monopoly “are almost always 
challenged,”132 with clear ease-of-entry evidence, well-situated power buyers, or 
unique facts on efficiencies required for the merger to be cleared. This analysis 
by Malcolm Coate reports that an average of 36.7% of the complete sample 
(1989-2016) of mergers and 27.5% of the restricted (1993-2016) sample fall into 
 
not to pursue it); the initial investigative approach; and the outcome of any past 
investigations in the industry. 
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The Department of Justice states in addition that 
[a]s early as the preliminary investigation phase of a merger investigation, staff may 
find it advantageous to issue CIDs. While interviews are the primary tool available to 
staff at the preliminary investigation phase, in limited instances, CIDs—even CIDs 
for oral testimony—are the proper tool and necessary to help staff make significant 
progress toward resolving important issues (e.g., market definition, competitive 
overlaps, entry, efficiencies, and failing firm defenses). 
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added). 
128 United States Department of Justice Model Voluntary Request Letter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1111341/download [https://perma.cc/FP9P-PAK9] (last updated 
Nov. 2018) (“Submit documents analyzing, describing, or quantifying the efficiencies or synergies that 
the company believes will be generated by the transaction.”). But see Guidance for Voluntary Submission of 
Documents During the Initial Waiting Period, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program/hsr-resources/guidance-voluntary-submission-documents 
[https://perma.cc/7UED-BHE8] (last visited May 12, 2020) (showing that the public version of the 
Federal Trade Commission counterpart does not reference information about efficiencies). 
129 See Malcolm Coate, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade Commission from 
1989 to 2016 14 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955987 
[https://perma.cc/QZJ5-KABN] (“[F]irms can facilitate the staff review of efficiencies by directly 
providing the appropriate cognizability documentation.”). 
130 See Darren Tucker, A Survey Of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 602 (2012) (indicating that in studies of pre-Second Request FTC 
investigations from 2008-2012, merging parties supplied detailed efficiencies claims in only five of 
the fifty-eight cases in which efficiencies were asserted). 
131 Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 364 (2011). 
132 Coate, supra note 129, at 16. 
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this category, absorbing a substantial share of the enforcement agencies’ limited 
investigation and litigation resources.133 In addition, over 80% of three to two 
firm mergers were challenged; a majority of four to three firm mergers were 
challenged; but under less than a third of five to four firm mergers were 
challenged.134 
In sum, relatively few proposed mergers are fully investigated. A key 
methodology used to determine whether a Second Request should be issued 
is whether a proposed merger would result in significant increase of 
concentration in a highly concentrated market—an analysis that uses market 
concentration levels that the agencies have concluded support application of 
the structural presumption of competitive harm.135 
But that screen, in turn, rests on a belief that efficiencies are generally 
present in horizontal mergers and generally large enough to meaningful. 
The difficulty is that, as Part II demonstrates, the economics and business 
literatures cast doubts on the widespread prevalence of merger-related 
efficiencies. This calls into question the standard efficiency credit and 
suggests that the current concentration thresholds for defining problematic 
mergers, as they are applied, are too high. A similar conclusion is reached by 
recent work by Professors Nocke and Whinston, who suggest that under 
common models of competition, “prevention of consumer harm likely 
requires much more stringent thresholds than in the agencies’ current 2010 
Guidelines. Indeed, with synergies of less than 5%, consumer harm occurs 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id., at 1, 27, 36 tbl.5 (2018) (“Most three-to-two and many four-to-three mergers end up as 
challenged, while other transactions often pass through the review process.”); id. at 27 (“Merger 
challenges are likely under either unilateral or collusion analyses for investigations with three pre-
merger rivals, but become unlikely when five or more pre-merger rivals exist.”); see also id. at 16 
(explaining that mergers to monopoly are almost always challenged and comprised 36.7% of the 
challenged mergers between 1989 and 2016). 
135 There is another important variable. The more narrowly that a product market is defined, 
the higher the market concentration impact is likely to be if the firms are in fact in the same narrow 
market. For example, Coca-Cola undoubtedly has a higher market share of a hypothetical product 
market of carbonated drinks than it would of a product market consisting of all beverages available 
at a supermarket (including, say, bottled water, milk and coffee). This helps explain why antitrust 
litigation so often focuses on the appropriate definition of a market. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods 
Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In this case	.	.	.	the FTC itself made market 
definition key. It claimed ‘[t]he operation of premium natural and organic supermarkets is a distinct 
‘line of commerce’ within the meaning of Section 7,’ and its theory of anticompetitive effect was that 
the merger would ‘substantially increase concentration in the operation of [the premium natural and 
organic supermarkets market].’”); id., at 1043-1049 (Tatel, J. concurring) (“I agree with the district 
court that this ‘case hinges—almost entirely—on the proper definition of the relevant product 
market,’ for if a separate natural and organic market exists, ‘there can be little doubt that the 
acquisition of the second largest firm in the market by the largest firm in the market will tend to 
harm competition in that market.’”). Had the implementation of the 2010 HMG resulted in 
narrower product markets, the impact of the market-concentration measures would be expected to 
capture a higher percentage of mergers. See Email from Carl Shapiro infra note 152. 
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when the merging firms’ shares are much like those in the 1968 Guidelines’ 
thresholds.”136 Ensuring that enforcement policy protects consumers from 
problematic mergers requires the agencies to re-visit their assumptions about 
the existence and magnitude of efficiencies, and likely roll back structural 
presumption thresholds for market concentration and changes in 
concentration that identify the mergers are that presumed (subject to 
rebuttal) to be anticompetitive.137 
IV. THE FEW: INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION 
The failure to consider how few mergers are fully investigated and the 
extent to which those that are investigated focus on highly concentrated 
markets has led to erroneous criticism of the manner in which efficiencies are 
assessed by the agencies and courts in the second class of mergers—the only 
ones that the federal agencies litigate. Here we examine two specific 
assertions, first that the antitrust agencies and courts should consider “out-
of-market” benefits even if participants in a specific market suffer harm that 
those benefits do not offset; second, that merging parties are forced to bear 
an “asymmetric” burden when they are put to the test of demonstrating that 
efficiencies are cognizable. 
Both theories must be understood in context. Second Request 
investigations invariably focus on the mergers viewed by the antitrust 
agencies as most troublesome, as shown by the  outcomes of mergers subject 
to these full-blown investigations.138 Over the 2007-2018 period, few mergers 
subject to a Second Request investigation proceeded; of an average 48 Second 
Request investigations opened each year, only nine (20%) were closed without 
a litigated challenge, consent decree settling the anticompetitive concerns, or 
abandonment by the parties.139 Not surprisingly, one study reports that over 
 
136 Nocke & Whinston, supra note 58, at 2. Their analysis also suggests that the change in levels 
of concentration may be a more relevant indicator of competitive harm, which may occur at delta 
HHIs that are substantially smaller than the delta HHI of 200 used in the 2010 HMGs. See Kaplow, 
supra note 11, at 45 n.123 (providing analysis suggesting “that an efficiency credit does not make sense 
or, perhaps, should be set at a fairly low level”.); id. at 43 (“this credit is fairly large”). 
137 Or otherwise compensate for the under-inclusiveness of the current screen applied to apply 
the structural presumption. Louis Kaplow raises similar concerns about the informal use of a 
standard efficiency credit, asking, for example, “Is there one credit for all mergers? Regardless of the 
industry? The size of the merging parties?”. Kaplow, supra note 11, at 44. 
138 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 2-6 (describing the outcome of horizontal merger 
investigations). 
139 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 3 [hereinafter 2007 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission challenged 
twenty-two transactions	.	.	.	.	[and] [t]he Antitrust Division challenged twelve merger 
transactions	.	.	.	.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 1 [hereinafter 2008 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission 
challenged 21 transactions	.	.	.	.”); id. at 7 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 16 merger 
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the last decade-and-a-half, FTC staff support for claimed efficiencies in full-
fledged investigations declined.140 
One could read these results in two ways. On the one hand, the agencies’ 
success in blocking or modifying mergers they flag for investigation may seem 
high. But, of course, the cases are not randomly selected—they are chosen 
precisely because the agencies believe them to carry the most serious threats 
of competitive harm. Thus, given the likelihood that too generous a “standard 
efficiency credit” has led to market concentration thresholds that are too high, 
the conclusion that efficiencies are typically adjudged to be insufficient 
following an in-depth investigation is not surprising. The narrower the 
aperture, the more likely it is that an overwhelming percentage of fully 
investigated mergers will ultimately prove to be problematic. 
Although not binding on the judiciary, courts have tended to embrace the 
Agencies’ approach to efficiencies, despite the ongoing debate as to whether 
 
transactions	.	.	.	.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 1 [hereinafter 2009 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission 
challenged 19 transactions	.	.	.	.”); id. at 7 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 12 merger 
transactions	.	.	.	.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 [hereinafter 2010 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission 
challenged 22 transactions	.	.	.	.”); id. at 2 (“The Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger 
transactions.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 2 [hereinafter 2011 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission 
challenged 17 transactions	.	.	.	.	[and] [t]he Antitrust Division challenged 20 merger transactions.”); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2012 2 [hereinafter 2012 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 25 merger 
enforcement actions	.	.	.	. [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger transactions	.	.	.	.”); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 2 [hereinafter 2013 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 23 merger 
enforcement actions	.	.	.	.	[and] the Antitrust Division challenged 15 merger transactions.”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 2 [hereinafter 2014 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought seventeen merger 
enforcement challenges	.	.	.	.	[and] the Antitrust Division challenged sixteen merger transactions.”); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 2 [hereinafter 2015 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger 
enforcement challenges	.	.	.	.	[and] the Antitrust Division challenged 20 merger transactions.”); 2016 
HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at 2 (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger enforcement 
challenges	.	.	.	. [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 25 merger transactions.”); id. at app. A 
(demonstrating the number of transactions receiving second requests in each year between 2007 and 
2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 2 [hereinafter 2017 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 23 
merger enforcement challenges	.	.	.	. [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 18 merger 
transactions.”); 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 2 (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger 
enforcement challenges.”); id. at 3 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 17 merger transactions.”); 
id. at app. A (demonstrating the number of transactions receiving second requests in each year 
between 2009 and 2018). 
140 Coate, supra note 129, at 24-26 (noting that the probability of efficiency findings declined). 
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federal law recognizes an efficiency defense.141 Thus, for example, federal 
courts have required merging parties to demonstrate verifiable efficiencies 
that are merger-specific and that will benefit consumers.142 The Department 
of Justice has insisted that the examination of claimed efficiencies by courts 
be rigorous.143 “The trend among lower courts has thus been to recognize or 
at least assume that evidence of efficiencies may rebut the presumption that 
a merger’s effects will be anticompetitive, even if such evidence could not be 
used as a defense to an actually anticompetitive merger.”144 
Despite this consideration, the operation of the current efficiencies 
standard has been criticized. The legal system has been characterized as 
unsympathetic to an efficiencies defense, and some have argued that the test 
for assessing efficiencies must be defective in some respect given that no 
merging parties have been able to sustain that defense in litigation.145 This 
premise is not strictly true: the 2020 district court decision in New York v. 
Deutsche Telekom held that a horizontal merger between Sprint and T-Mobile 
did not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act despite the presence of the 
structural presumption, by relying in part on efficiencies that the court found 
to be cognizable.146 Recognition of efficiencies also played a role, albeit a 
 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Despite, 
however, widespread acceptance of the potential benefit of efficiencies as an economic matter .	.	. it 
is not at all clear that they offer a viable legal defense to illegality under Section 7.”). 
142 See St. Alphonsus Med. Center-Nampa Inc., v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 
790-91 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The defendant must also demonstrate that the claimed efficiencies are 
merger-specific, which is to say that the efficiencies cannot readily be achieved without the 
concomitant loss of a competitor.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also FTC 
v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2001) 721-22 (finding that the district court’s inquiry into the 
verifiable efficiencies was insufficient because “the district court failed to make the kind of factual 
determinations necessary to render the appellees’ efficiency defense sufficiently concrete”); FTC v. 
Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A] defendant may rebut the government’s 
prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would create significant efficiencies 
in the relevant market.”). 
143 See, e.g., Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States at 44, United States v. AT&T, 
Inc. (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-02511-RJL) 2017 WL 6329012, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/1061066/download [https://perma.cc/88KE-ZUES] (“To the extent the Court 
entertains Defendants’ efficiencies defense, the Court ‘must undertake a rigorous analysis’ of the 
claimed efficiencies.	.	.	.	The requirements for a successful efficiencies defense are [very] 
rigorous	.	.	.	.”) (internal citation omitted). 
144 New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434-VM-RWL, slip op. at 57 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 10, 2020). 
145 E.g., Crane, supra note 131 (noting the asymmetrical imbalance between the lower threshold 
of proving potential harms and the greater hurdles of showing offsetting efficiencies); Erin L. 
Shencopp & Nathaniel J. Harris, Using Efficiencies To Defend Mergers: The Current Legal Landscape, 
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2019, at 2 (claiming that no case to date has held asserted 
efficiencies were sufficient to overcome establish anticompetitive effects of a merger). 
146 See Deutsche Telekom, slip op. at 83 (“[T]he Court concludes that Defendants’ proposed 
efficiencies are cognizable	.	.	.	.”). The court was careful to note that the cognizable efficiencies “do not 
alone possess dispositive weight in this inquiry.” Id. In particular, the court separately placed weight on 
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smaller one, in the only other case in which the government lost a merger 
challenge after establishing the structural presumption.147 
Before considering the content of two more specific criticisms—the “out-
of-market” and “asymmetry” arguments—it is worth understanding their 
pedigree. As we have seen, two fundamental views of efficiencies arose in the 
Williamson-Bork formulations. First, both Williamson and Bork argued for 
a total welfare approach, which meant that consumers could be subject to 
higher prices so long as someone else garners benefits greater than the loss 
suffered by those consumers in the harmed market; an approach that could 
justify harm to competition in an identifiable market.148 In the original 
formulation, indeed in the Williamson graph reproduced in Part I above, that 
“someone” could be the newly-merged firm itself, in circumstances in which 
its post-merger increase in profits exceeded the total of higher prices paid by 
its customers. Second, Bork (but not Williamson) eschewed any attempt to 
calculate efficiencies individually; he preferred a relaxed, structural approach 
that would permit most horizontal mergers to proceed. The “out-of-market” 
and “asymmetry” contentions reflect considerations found in each of these 
early views. We now examine each in turn. 
A. “Out-of-Market” Efficiencies 
One way to understand the total welfare approach is to recognize that, in 
essence, it justifies approval of mergers that harm consumers in an identified 
market as long as a greater amount of benefit appears elsewhere in the system. 
That argument was rejected by the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in 
Philadelphia National Bank. The Court held that merging parties cannot 
justify harm to one set of customers by showing that a merger benefits a 
different set of customers (in that case consumer borrowers versus 
commercial borrowers).149 This approach—focusing on efficiency benefits in 
the markets that may otherwise suffer harm—is employed by the agencies 
 
“Sprint’s decreasing competitive relevance,” id., at 84, and on remedies that would, for example, work 
“to establish DISH as a fourth nationwide [carrier] and replacement for Sprint.” Id. at 106. 
147 See FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 151 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that the 
structural presumption was overcome because the court focused on a review of market conditions 
but did not place weight on the parties’ efficiencies defense); id. at 153 (recognizing the existence of 
some cognizable efficiencies, but not enough to “defeat the plaintiffs’ claim of anticompetitive 
effects”—they simply provided “some limited additional evidence” to rebut the FTC’s claim of 
anticompetitive harm); see also United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (holding that 
market concentration measures were not determinative in light of other market characteristics). 
148 Salop, supra note 72, at 350-53 (describing inefficiencies created by the aggregate welfare 
standard). 
149 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“[A] merger the effect of 
which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning 
of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”). 
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today. The 2010 HMG explain that “the Agencies consider whether 
cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s 
potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price 
increases in that market.”150 Thus, the Department of Justice recently 
emphasized that competitive benefits “must also ‘pass[]through to consumers, 
rather than simply bolstering [the defendant’s] profit margin.’”151 
Some commentators argue that harm to consumers in one market should 
be balanced against benefits to consumers in some other markets. This 
argument has been advanced by current FTC Commissioner Wilson. She 
argues that product markets are being defined too narrowly; a trend she 
believes increases the importance of recognizing out-of-market efficiencies.152 
Former Commissioner Wright writes bluntly: “[r]ejection of out-of-market 
efficiencies is an obsolete approach	.	.	.	that was born out of an era in which 
efficiencies justifications in merger cases generally were viewed with 
considerable skepticism.”153 
This resembles the total welfare approach in the following sense: harm to 
participants in a properly-defined market is justified by a finding that 
participants in another market will benefit. In fact, there are economic and 
jurisprudential reasons to ensure that horizontal mergers do not leave 
definable classes of market participants harmed.154 
To begin, the empirical economic evidence does not lend support to any 
current claim for increased permissiveness of enforcement. Nor is there any 
basis to believe that efficiencies should be treated generously on the ground 
 
150 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
151 Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States, supra note 143, at 48 (quoting United 
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
152 See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Unintended Consequences 
of Narrower Product Markets and the Overly Leveraged Nature of Philadelphia National Bank: Remarks 
as Prepared for Delivery at the Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 2019 4, 13, 17 (2019) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1532894/wilson_-_remarks_at_oxford_
antitrust_enforcement_symposium_6-30-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZM8-WST3] (describing the 
issue of product markets and out-of-market efficiencies in more detail). But cf. Email from Carl Shapiro, 
Professor, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, to Nancy Rose and Jonathan Sallet, (Mar. 17, 2020) (“[T]he way to 
strengthen merger enforcement is to reinvigorate the structural presumption while explaining that 
narrow markets often are appropriate. The HHI levels in the 2010 HMG would be strong enough, in 
my view, if markets are defined narrowly, as implied by the HMT.”). 
153 Jan Rybnicek & Joshua Wright, Outside In or Inside Out?: Counting Merger Efficiencies 
Inside and Out of the Relevant Market 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2411270  [https://perma.cc/QG58-RDUW]. The invocation of two-sided markets, as adopted 
unfortunately for transactions markets in Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), has a 
similar quality: harm to merchants and to consumers that do not use American Express cards was 
balanced against benefits to American Express cardholders. 
154 Bork himself seems to suggest that balancing consumer harm versus benefit to the firm is beyond 
the ambit of the courts, although the example he gives assumes a world in which there is “no danger of a 
monopoly profit” and therefore may reflect his view that extra-economic considerations are for legislatures 
to consider. See Bork, supra note 13, at 80 (“Striking the balance is essentially a legislative task.”). 
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that markets will self-correct155 and that, therefore, it is better to permit than 
disallow a proposed merger. 
The inclusion of out-of-market effects threatens to over-complicate 
economic analysis. Imagine a world in which two companies A and B supply 
Product X to a few customers and Products Y and Z to a larger, separate class 
of customers. Were the two companies to merge, they would have a monopoly 
in the manufacture of Product X but they claim efficiencies that would deliver 
slightly lower prices in the more competitive markets that sell to the 
customers of Products Y and Z. They assert that the sum of the lower prices 
spread among the customers of Products Y and Z is greater than the sum of 
the high prices to the customers of Product X. 
To analyze that claim would reasonably require an analysis of the general 
equilibrium effects of the merger; an “unrealistic if not impossible” task.156 
And it is a task with significant distributional implications as some groups 
lose and others win; indeed Williamson himself highlighted the complexity 
of assessing redistributional effects as one of the major qualifications to the 
total welfare approach to efficiency analysis.157 Moreover, harm stays put: 
There is no mechanism to require those who benefit to compensate those who 
are harmed.158 
 
155 See Jonathan Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 
127 YALE L.J. 1916, 1919 (2018) (calling upon antitrust enforcers to recognize how underenforcement 
might not be corrected). 
156 JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE 
ECONOMY 191-92 (2019) (“[O]nce the analysis extends beyond the market in which harm is alleged, there 
may be no principled stopping point short of undertaking what is unrealistic if not impossible: a general 
equilibrium analysis of harms and benefits throughout the entire economy.”). The general equilibrium 
effects refer to tracing the direct and indirect effects of a merger throughout all parts of the economy. 
157 Williamson wrote that  
[i]nasmuch as the income redistribution which occurs is usually large relative to the 
size of the dead-weight loss, attaching even a slight weight to income distribution 
effects can sometimes influence the overall valuation significantly.	.	.	.	[T]he transfer 
involved could be regarded unfavorably not merely because it redistributes income in 
an undesirable way	.	.	. but also because it produces social discontent. This latter has 
serious efficiency implications that the above analysis does not take explicitly into 
account.	.	.	. Distinguishing social from private costs in this respect may, however, be 
the most fundamental reason for treating claims of private efficiency gains skeptically. 
 
Williamson, supra note 33, at 28. Jonathan Baker similarly relies upon the importance of maintaining 
continuing public support for antitrust in his analysis, as a matter of political economy. BAKER, supra 
note 156, at 192 (“It is hard to tell consumers, farmers, workers, and suppliers	.	.	.	that they must 
experience competitive harms in order to permit large firms to lower costs or to allow buyers 
purchasing in other markets to pay less, without leading those victims of market power to question 
the benefit of the political bargain.”). 
158 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 370 (2016) 
(“‘Balancing’ requires values that can be cardinally measured and weighed against each other. The 
factors that are supposedly balanced in Sherman Act cases almost never fit this description.”). 
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Recall that cross-market effects would only come into play if and when a 
complete analysis demonstrates that, even with consideration of efficiencies, 
the impact of the merger “may be substantially to lessen competition.”159 The 
likely impact of an “out-of-market” test would thus be to tremendously 
complicate antitrust enforcement by requiring agencies that have already 
proven harm in one market to take on a full analysis of other markets. Indeed, 
courts would not only need to assess the individual outcomes of each market 
but they would need to assess the causation between outcomes in different 
markets; as the 2010 HMG explain, “a proffered efficiency cannot arise from 
anticompetitive effects.”160 
Such an extra burden where harm has been proven is particularly 
troublesome given the likelihood that merger enforcement is already “under 
deterrent.”161 Thus, concerns about administrability of an “out-of-market” 
standard counsel against the introduction of cross-market effects.162 
A central tenet of antitrust law has been that the law does not 
accommodate and the courts will not countenance any attempt to say that 
harming competition is justified by other outcomes.163 Competition “cannot 
 
159 Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers the effect of which “may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. §	18 (2018). 
160 United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millet, J., concurring). 
161 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 705; see also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
162 See BAKER, supra note 156, at 191 (“The judicial prohibition against cross-market welfare trade-
offs has an obvious administrability justification: the prohibition reduces the complexity of the 
reasonableness evaluation under review.”); Daniel Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 397, 409-10 (2015) (“The most convincing justification for a market-specificity rule is that balancing 
pro- and anticompetitive effects across market boundaries unduly increases the complexity of antitrust 
decision making.”). Both Professor Baker and Professor Crane would be open to the calculation of cross-
market effects in certain circumstances; for example, Professor Baker believes that  
a court should allow a cross-market welfare trade-off when it is evident from a 
qualitative comparison that the harm to competition in one market is small while the 
benefit to competition in another market is vastly greater and there is no practical way 
to obtain the benefit without accepting the harm. 
BAKER, supra note 156, at 192-93. Professor Crane favors “placing on the merging parties the burden 
of proving that the balancing factors allowing the merger” but not making it a part of the 
government’s prima facie case. Crane, supra, at 410. We prefer the reliance on prosecutorial 
discretion embodied in note 14 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the fashioning of 
appropriate remedies, such a divestiture in markets where harm would occur in order to permit 
benefits to accrue in other markets. Such an approach to remedies was taken, for example, in the 
DOJ approval of the Dow-Dupont merger in 2017. See generally Competitive Impact Statement, 
United States v. Dow Chemical Company, No. 1:17-cv-01176, 2017 WL 7118164 (D.D.C. June 15, 2017). 
163 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978) (rejecting the 
asserted defense that minimum prices are a way to guarantee safety of construction and the court’s 
response); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (“If a decision is to be made 
to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for greater competition in another portion this 
.	.	. is a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private forces or the courts.”); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1979) (“[A] conclusion that excessive competition 
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be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain 
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater 
competition in a more important sector of the economy.”164 
B. Asymmetry of Burdens 
The “asymmetry” approach contends that an improperly high burden is 
placed on merging parties to rebut the government’s showing of harm. We 
understand this approach to argue, in essence, that too much is demanded of 
merging parties, given the generalized likelihood that efficiencies will 
occur.165 Thus, Professor Crane asserts an “asymmetry” in the burden placed 
on the government to prove its prima facie case and the burden placed upon 
defendants to rebut it.166 Commissioner Wilson notes precedent from 
multiple federal courts of appeals that in highly concentrated markets, “the 
magnitude of those efficiencies that remain in the relevant market must 
substantially exceed the magnitude of harms.”167 
But the burden of production requirement flows logically from the fact 
that it is the merging parties that have the information and incentive to 
demonstrate efficiencies. Once a prima facie case is established (typically but 
not necessarily through the structural presumption), the burden of proof 
appropriately falls on the merging parties. Williamson was resolute in 
dismissing anything less than this: 
[I]f efficiencies are to be a defense at all, it is clear that the companies which 
are, presumably, sensitive to the relevant economies in proposing the merger 
 
would cause one side of the market more harm than good may justify a legislative exemption from the 
antitrust laws, but does not constitute a defense to a violation of the Sherman Act.”). 
164 Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610; see, e.g., United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“[T]he dissent’s theory—that the presence of a strong competitor justifies a horizontal price-fixing 
conspiracy—endorses a concept of marketplace vigilantism that is wholly foreign to the antitrust laws.”). 
165 Professor Wright labels his “out-of-market” view in terms of asymmetry as well. See 
Rybnicek & Wright, supra note 153, at 5. 
166 Crane, supra note 131, at 347-49. Under established precedent, the government can establish a 
prima facie case by satisfying the structural presumption. If that is done, then the merging parties must 
produce evidence to show that other factors, which can include efficiency, negate the threat of 
anticompetitive harm. If that occurs, then the government has the opportunity to produce additional 
evidence to support its claim. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (“The basic outline of a section 7 horizontal acquisition case is familiar. By showing that a 
transaction will lead to undue concentration in the market for a particular product in a particular 
geographic area, the government establishes a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen 
competition.	.	.	.	The burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption then shifts to the 
defendant.	.	.	.	If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden of producing additional 
evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of 
persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
167 Wilson, supra note 152, at 14. 
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in the first place, must be prepared to make the case for them in court. They 
have the data and these must be supplied.168 
As the 2010 HMG explain, “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and 
quantify, in part because much of the information relating to efficiencies is 
uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.”169 Moreover, the ability to 
achieve efficiencies depends on execution by the new firm and “efficiencies 
projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms may not be 
realized.”170 Professor Hovenkamp explains that “evidence of efficiencies 
typically relates to a firm’s own internal production and processes.	.	.	. [F]irms 
almost always know more about their own internal processes and the costs of 
changing them than any outside, including the merger enforcement 
Agencies.”171 
Indeed, the burden of showing efficiencies grows with increased threat of 
harm.172 Given that the merger cases being brought by the antitrust agencies 
against horizontal mergers focus precisely on the cases that present the 
strongest showing of harm,173 the current requirements placed on merging 
parties are necessary to ensure that the historic, overly generous view of 
efficiencies does not override well-grounded predictions of competitive harm. 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional analysis of the treatment of efficiency claims has paid too 
little attention to the fact that the overwhelming majority of horizontal 
mergers that are not fully-investigated and has failed to recognize that the 
small number that are subject to Second Requests are precisely those in which 
the risk of harm is likely to be the greatest. 
The economic literature demonstrates that efficiencies are neither as 
ubiquitous nor as uniformly large as the notion of a standard efficiency credit 
suggests. This provides reason to suspect that market concentration thresholds 
as they are applied are too lax. Given the challenge of reviewing efficiencies 
 
168 Williamson, supra note 33, at 24. 
169 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30. 
170 Id. 
171 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 725-26. 
172 See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that a pre-
merger HHI score indicating “a highly concentrated industry” combined with a projected 510 point 
increase in the HHI score after the merger created “by a wide margin, a presumption that the merger 
will lessen competition”); see also 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31 (“When the potential adverse 
competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable 
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. In adhering to 
this approach, the Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, not internal 
operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”). 
173 See supra note 103. 
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without a full-fledged investigation, it is not realistic to imagine that 
significantly more could be done to analyze merger-specific efficiencies short 
of a Second Request. This suggests that market concentration thresholds 
should be re-examined and, very probably, lowered. Because we believe that 
the total welfare analysis is incorrect and that customers in properly defined 
markets should not suffer harm merely because others benefit, proposals to 
consider “out-of-market” benefits should be similarly rejected. 
Additionally, we do not believe too much is asked of merging parties when 
they must rebut the government’s prima facie case. First, the merging firms 
are the entities with the knowledge and data required to calibrate plausible 
merger-specific efficiencies. Of even greater import, if the effect of the 
market concentration standards is to identify mergers that are particularly 
problematic (because only those are being investigated and challenged), then 
the criticism of the way agencies and courts approach efficiencies is 
misplaced. If only the most threatening mergers are being subject to review, 
these are the mergers where the burden of demonstrating efficiencies should 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Number of Transactions Reported under the Hart–Scott–Rodino 





















as % of 
Eligible 
Transactions 
2007 2,108 1,840 1,402 706 33.5% 
2008 1,656 1,385 1,021 635 38.3% 
2009 684 575 396 288 42.1% 
2010 1,128 953 704 424 37.6% 
2011 1,414 1,157 888 526 37.2% 
2012 1,400 1,094 902 498 35.6% 
2013 1,286 990 797 489 38.0% 
2014 1,618 1,274 1,020 598 37.0% 
2015 1,754 1,366 1,086 668 38.1% 
2016 1,772 1,374 1,102 670 37.8% 
2017 1,992 1,552 1,220 772 38.8% 
2018 2,028 1,500 1,170 858 42.3% 
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Table A2: Number of Transactions Receiving Second Requests as Portion 






























2007 2,108 706 63 3.0% 8.9% 
2008 1,656 635 41 2.5% 6.5% 
2009 684 288 31 4.5% 10.8% 
2010 1,128 424 42 3.7% 9.9% 
2011 1,414 526 55 3.9% 10.5% 
2012 1,400 498 49 3.5% 9.8% 
2013 1,286 489 47 3.7% 9.6% 
2014 1,618 598 51 3.2% 8.5% 
2015 1,754 668 47 2.7% 7.0% 
2016 1,772 670 54 3.0% 8.1% 
2017 1,992 772 51 2.6% 6.6% 
2018 2,028 858 45 2.2% 5.2% 
AVERAGE 1,570 594 48 3.2% 8.5% 
